Beyond the crisis in Ukraine. Russian and EU perceptions of European security and potential implications for Europe and Norway by Rieker, Pernille & Gjerde, Kristian Lundby
1Policy Brief
Beyond the crisis in Ukraine
Russian and EU perceptions of European security and 
potential implications for Europe and Norway
Pernille Rieker and Kristian Lundby Gjerde
Introduction 
Recent developments in European security have shown the 
growing need for a better understanding of the dynamics that 
may both threaten and ensure security and stability on the 
European continent. This policy brief is based on the analysis 
made in a recent NUPI working paper (Rieker & Gjerde 2015) 
where we present in more detail the differing Russian and 
European perceptions of European security. In addition to pro-
viding an overview of the different perceptions, we also study 
what happens when the two collide like we have been witness-
ing in Ukraine. As much of the literature on these issues has 
been normatively driven, our aim has been to provide an objec-
tive presentation and analysis of the dominant Russian and 
EU discourses. This we see as essential for investigating the 
potential for constructive dialogue between Russia and the EU. 
Making a serious effort to understand the other side’s point 
of view does not mean justifying or accepting that position. 
However, it is crucial to recognize that different actors have 
different reference frames, and that this in turn may lead 
them to perceive events very differently. As the US scholar 
Robert Jervis observed nearly 40 years ago, misperceptions 
of others’ perceptions are a continuous source of conflicts in 
the international arena (Jervis 1976: 409–410).
By not seriously engaging with both EU and Russian percep-
tions, we risk having a poorer basis for policy development. 
If simplistic assumptions about the motivations and inten-
tions of other actors take hold in the public debate and policy 
analyses, the main actors may be drawn into a logic that is 
ultimately dangerous or counter-productive. 
Thus, our aim has been to offer a modest contribution 
towards discouraging such a development in Russia–EU 
relations. In this policy brief we provide a summary of the 
main findings of our working paper (Rieker & Gjerde 2015), 
but also point to some potential implications for European, 
including Norwegian, security. 
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Colliding perceptions of European security 
Informed discussion of possible ways of ensuring European 
security requires a clear understanding of the underpinnings 
of Russian as well as EU security thinking. In his recent book 
about the Ukraine crisis, Richard Sakwa (2015: 26) argues 
that two opposing visions of Europe have collided. First, the 
idea of a ‘“Wider Europe” with the EU at its heart but increas-
ingly coterminous with the Euro-Atlantic security and political 
community’; second, the idea of a ‘Greater Europe’, with ‘a 
vision of a continental Europe, stretching from Lisbon to Vladi-
vostok, that has multiple centres, including Brussels, Moscow 
and Ankara, but with a common purpose in overcoming the 
divisions that have traditionally plagued the continent.’ 
These two visions build on very different conceptual frame-
works and assumptions about the functioning of interna-
tional politics, which in turn leads to different perspectives 
on European security. Clarification is crucial to understand-
ing what happens when these two opposing ideas collide, as 
they have done and still do with the Ukraine crisis.
The EU and its security community building 
The main ideas behind the European integration process and 
the conviction that economic integration and security are 
closely linked fit well with Sakwa’s ‘Wider Europe’ perspec-
tive. In fact, these ideas have been at the core of the integration 
process that was first initiated in Western Europe after the end 
of the Second World War. At that time, economic integration 
was seen as crucial for ensuring peace on the European conti-
nent. This peace project has gradually expanded since the end 
of the Cold War, when the process of including Central and 
Eastern European countries as well as former Soviet republics 
was initiated. While the former joined the EU in 2004, the lat-
ter were offered a kind of looser association through the frame-
work of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) in 2004 
and the Eastern Partnership (EaP) in 2009. The initial inten-
tion was also to find a way of including Russia in this process.
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More recently, the concept of security community or security 
community building has been used to describe the EU and 
the integration process (Rieker, forthcoming). This perspec-
tive can offer useful insights for understanding the EU’s 
policy towards Ukraine. After all, this policy (as well as the 
European Neighbourhood Policy and the Eastern Partner-
ship) has been developed largely on the template of the 
enlargement process, and the EU’s aim has been to expand 
its security community through comprehensive association 
agreements. Ideas of security community building have also 
been praised in the West: the EU was even awarded the Nobel 
Peace Prize for this in 2012. However, we must ask: what 
happens to these ideas when they are challenged by collid-
ing Russian ideas about European security? 
Russia and multipolarity
In contrast to the EU-centred security community perspec-
tive, Russia has promoted a multipolar vision of European 
security, with ‘more than one centre and without a single 
ideological flavour’. This is what Sakwa calls the ‘Greater 
Europe’ perspective – as opposed to an EU- or NATO-domi-
nated type of cooperation (Sakwa 2015: 27). The main prin-
ciple is that real security must be shared by all; keywords 
here are ‘indivisible security’ and ‘equal cooperation’ (For-
eign Policy Concept 2013). 
Like the EU, Russia has been quite consistent as to the basic 
premises of its perspective on European security and the 
need for an inclusive European security architecture. At the 
same time Moscow has been concerned ‘about the attempts 
to put NATO at the centre of the emerging European security 
system’ because that would ‘objectively [weaken] the role of 
the OSCE, which has the greatest potential for balancing the 
interests of all European countries’ (Putin 2000). Moreover, 
Moscow has increasingly perceived the EU’s foreign policy as 
linked to NATO.
 
The backdrop was – and still is – that, whereas the West views 
the eastward expansion of the EU and NATO after the end of 
the Cold War as a great success for stability and democracy in 
Europe, Russia perceives this as a fundamental mistake that has 
squandered the unique opportunity to build a truly inclusive 
security order. The Kremlin believes that, by disregarding this 
idea of a ‘Greater Europe’, the EU (or the West more broadly) is 
creating new division lines in Europe, and the ‘Wider Europe’ 
expansion is seen as building a bulwark against Russia.
Thus, the Ukraine crisis is perceived as a direct result of this 
Western policy – in much the same way as many in the West 
see the crisis as confirming the correctness of expanding 
Western security instruments eastwards.
Security community building and multipolarity as 
incompatible logics? 
While Putin’s first period was interpreted in the EU as showing 
willingness to accept the ‘Wider Europe’ perspective, it soon 
became clear that this was not the case. In Sergei Karaganov’s 
(2005) words, in the early 2000s ‘Europe and Russia drew 
closer together again only to realize how different they were.’ 
And yet, this mutual recognition of differences has not been 
accompanied by an understanding of how these differences 
could be managed. While the situation has often been described 
as a ‘competition between a benign, normative power Europe, 
on the one hand, and a malign Russian “sphere of influence”’, 
it is also possible to underscore how EU’s approach in reality 
left very ‘little room for enhanced dialogue’ with Russia (Averre 
2009: 1708) – to the dismay of Moscow. 
As the EU continued its project of building a security commu-
nity, bringing it closer to Russia’s borders, and Russia started its 
own Eurasian integration project, geopolitics did emerge at the 
centre of EU–Russia relations – although it took some time for 
the EU to realize that. The security community building project 
(operationalized through the EaP) began to compete directly 
with Russia’s own integration project.
Russia’s view can be seen as opposition to unipolarity on several 
levels. Most obviously, Moscow objects to a security arrange-
ment with one centre (Brussels/Washington). Second, it has 
increasingly objected to the EU’s claim to ‘normative hegemony 
in Europe’ (Haukkala 2015: 36). And finally, Russian has been 
annoyed by the EU’s attempt to define the countries bordering 
on the EU as Europe’s neighbours, thus equating the EU and 
Europe as such. Where the West sees progressive and mutually 
beneficial expansion of stability and democracy, Russia sees 
hypocrisy, double standards and Western blindness to the view-
points of others – and outright hostility towards Russia. 
EU–Russia relations have reached a high level of tension 
recently, but this has not always been the case (for more 
information about the main phases in the relationship, see 
Rieker & Gjerde 2015: 11-16). 
The crisis in Ukraine – a game changer?
While the disagreements that led up to the crisis in Ukraine 
must be seen in relation to the differing worldviews outlined 
above, we also hold that the conflict has challenged these 
worldviews, ultimately leading to certain changes or adapta-
tion, particularly in the EU’s approach (Rieker & Gjerde 2015: 
16-23). As we also show in the paper, the causes of the conflict 
are presented very differently in the EU and in Russia. To the 
former, in line with the idea of a wider Europe and security 
community building, the main causes of the conflict are Rus-
sian aggression and lack of respect for Ukrainians sovereignty 
as well as for international law. Russia, by contrast, considers 
the crisis to have been provoked by the Western-created mis-
balance in the security system that has emerged since the end 
of the Cold War, and the West’s seeming inability to recognize 
that it is erecting new division lines in Europe. These differ-
ing views have also had support in academic circles (see e.g. 
Mearsheimer 2014; McFaul et al. 2014).
Throughout the crisis, both the EU and Russia seem to have 
expected the other side to admit the fundamental misguid-
edness of its earlier ways. They have certainly waited for the 
other side to adjust its approach towards Ukraine. While the 
essence of the conflict remains, and the EU has not lifted any 
sanctions or made any concessions concerning Crimea, Brus-
sels has also gradually showed a somewhat greater willing-
ness to accommodate Russia – or at least enter into some sort 
of dialogue with Moscow.
Let us briefly note three instances of interaction between the 
EU (or its member states) with Russia. First, there are the Nor-
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mandy consultations, intended to facilitate a solution to the 
conflict in Eastern Ukraine. The EU as such does not partici-
pate in these consultations, but is represented by France and 
Germany, who make up the ‘Normandy Four’ together with 
Ukraine and Russia. Second, there are the regular consulta-
tions between Russia, Ukraine and the EU on implementation 
of the Association Agreement (AA), including the Deep Com-
prehensive Free Trade Agreement (DCFTA). In the beginning, 
the EU refused to consult Russia in these matters, seeing them 
as a bilateral concern involving the EU and Ukraine. However, 
in view of the circumstances, the EU has adjusted its original 
position and included Russia in ‘trilateral talks’.1 These talks 
have also resulted in postponing the provisional application of 
the DCFTA until 1 January 2016. Finally, although this remains 
contested internally in the EU, there are signs that the European 
Commission also will try to engage in some form of bilateral 
dialogue with the Eurasian Economic Union once a ceasefire 
can be fully implemented in Ukraine (Euractiv 2015a). 
Recent developments in these various dialogue formats 
clearly indicate that the EU has begun to adopt a more prag-
matic approach on Russia. Seen in addition to the recent 
revision of the Neighbourhood Policy (EU 2015), this might 
indicate that the EU is gradually moving away from its 
strictly normative-based approach, and that more weight is 
accorded to geopolitical considerations. 
Implications for European security
At first glance, it seems as if the differences between the EU’s 
security community logic (the ‘Wider Europe’ perspective) and 
Russia’s balance-of¬-power emphasis (the ‘Greater Europe’ 
perspective), are so fundamental that it is difficult to imagine 
any solutions unless at least one of the parties makes serious 
adjustments – perhaps even compromising on its basic ideas 
or interests. And yet, it might be possible to find a new type of 
working relationship between the two. As noted above, there 
are certain tendencies towards a partial ‘rapprochement’ 
despite the profound differences between the two parties – not 
least, certain important adjustments in the EU’s approach. 
On the Russian side, key foreign policy decisions are increas-
ingly taken within a very narrow circle around President 
Putin, and the main discourse is to a lesser extent challenged 
by influential actors domestically (at least in the open). Rus-
sian rhetoric has stressed that it is the EU that is adapting. 
Still, changes in Russian practices and discourse indicate 
willingness to find a compromise. These include Russia’s role 
in upholding the Minsk Agreement as well as the role played 
in the ongoing dialogue formats. President Putin’s annual 
address in December 2015 did not include one word about 
the Ukraine conflict – but there was much about the terrorist 
threat, and about the economy. Moscow appears to be tired of 
the Ukraine crisis and the consequences for Russia. However, 
the extent of changes in the fundamentals of foreign policy 
thinking is an entirely different matter.
Although the EU’s approach towards the ENP partner coun-
tries has been debated, the member states have, thus far, 
shown a high degree of unity, as shown by the unanimous 
decisions concerning the economic sanctions against Russia. 
Yet, perspectives can differ within the EU itself and among 
the member states – and these differences are increasingly 
coming to the fore. We may broadly distinguish between 
two schools of thought as to how to deal with Russia. The 
first, until recently the dominant one, largely represented by 
the East European member states, argues for containment. 
These ‘normative hardliners’ have no wish to compromise 
on the EU’s integrative (or security community building) 
approach where Europeanization and socialization through 
mechanisms of conditionality are at the core. They think that 
there is not much to discuss with Putin; Russia is typically 
assigned all blame for the crisis. Members of this group do 
not want the EU’s policy to be altered because of Russia, and 
they do not trust Russia’s ability to honour any agreement.
The second group, which now seems to be gaining increased 
support also in the EU as such, emphasizes the need to find a 
compromise solution. While not arguing that Western policies 
were to blame for the crisis, an increasing number of member 
states – including France and Germany as well as Commission 
President Juncker – have come out in favour of altering EU’s 
policy for the sake of European stability. Briefly put, they tend 
to seek ways of adapting the EU’s policy by increasingly taking 
into account the geopolitical realities and ‘the neighbour of 
the neighbours’: Russia. If this materializes, the EU will then 
depart from its long tradition of linking integration to security, 
at least in its relations with the post-Soviet states. While the 
change might be less dramatic for the EU – the long-term goal 
of democracy promotion and promoting good governance in its 
neighbourhood is likely to be upheld and even be strengthened 
by other means – it is likely to be viewed by Kyiv as a ‘broken 
promise’. But this development will still be justified in the 
name of ensuring European stability.
We see examples of this change in the apparently increasing 
willingness in Brussels to take part in dialogues of various 
formats, as well as acceptance of the need to find ways of 
accommodating Russia. With the joint communication on a 
revised European Neighbourhood Policy that was presented 
in November 2015 (EU 2015), the EU has also indicated a 
move away from its external governance logic. Such a revised 
ENP seems to be less focused on partner-county adaptation 
to the EU acquis, and more on various types of assistance 
programmes that take into account the individual needs of 
the partner countries as they proceed towards democracy 
and good governance (Batora & Rieker 2015). This means 
that the ENP will be changed into a specific foreign policy, 
rather than being part of an integration agenda. 
Undoubtedly, many in the West will be disheartened if, as a 
result of the Ukraine crisis, the EU changes its approach, and 
perhaps more significantly so than Russia. Ever since the start of 
the crisis, both the EU and Russia have waited for the other side 
to ‘see the light’. The EU has waited for Russia to act in accord-
ance with EU norms and expectations. Russia has waited for the 
EU to accept Moscow’s view of European security. Neither has 
happened. But as the situation on the ground has developed, 
the EU has also acknowledged the need to take into account 
the consequences – actual and potential – of the actions of a 
disgruntled Russia. In parallel, there are signs that Russia and 
France, but also the EU and the West as such, recognize the 
need for cooperation in the war against IS in Syria. Although 1 In addition to these initatives, similar talks have also been undertaken in 
relations to gas issues.
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such cooperation will be far from easy in practice, these recent 
events further underscore the trend whereby the EU is emphasiz-
ing security and stability over traditional normative concerns. 
Does this mean that the EU is changing as a security actor? It is 
still too early to say, but recent changes indicate that the EU is 
downplaying its attachment to the integration dynamic, while 
putting more emphasis on geopolitical realities. In this sense, 
the EU is gradually becoming a more strategic actor in its foreign 
policy. Spreading European core values will still be an ambition 
– but through other means. One lesson learnt from the Ukraine 
crisis is that there may well be geographical limitations to the 
traditional perspective of building a security community through 
the mechanisms of political and economic integration. 
Implications for Norway
What does such a change in the Union’s approach mean for Nor-
way, an associated member of the Union, an active supporter of 
EU’s integrative approach and with borders to Russia? The Ukraine 
crisis and the EU’s handling of it will have security-policy implica-
tions for Norway. Although Norway is not a full member of the EU, 
it is so closely linked that most third parties (including Russia) see 
it as an integral part of the EU integration process. This is due to 
the EEA agreement and other agreements that Norway has with 
the EU, but also to the fact that Norwegian governments have 
tended to align with most EU foreign-policy declarations. Also the 
current Norwegian government has supported the EU’s sanctions 
against Russia and provided additional financial assistance to 
Ukraine. Indeed, the government is now considering expanding 
the EEA financial grants to Ukraine,2 which may lead to a more 
direct involvement of Norway in the conflict. It is noteworthy that 
the Norwegian supported projects are also presented as projects 
that support the European integration process (Batora & Rieker 
2015). Finally, as an important energy provider, Norway is also 
a competitor to Russia. All these factors indicate that Norwegian 
security will be highly influenced by decisions taken in Brussels – 
concerning both Ukraine and Russia.
 If the different dialogue formats that recently have been launched 
between Russia and the EU succeed in developing a new relation-
ship between Russia and the EU (and also between Russia and the 
West) this will also most likely be beneficial for Norway. In many 
ways this change in the Union’s approach means that its policy will 
be more in line with the traditional Norwegian policy of having a 
balanced relationship with Russia. 
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